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Explaining Pathe’s 
Global Dominance  
in the pre-Hollywood film industry. 
!  © Jon Silver 2008               
     
Pathe dominates world film markets 
  
!  Variety: “from 1900 to 1914 the French dominated the world market but lost it to America 
during the war years” (Moskowitz 1956)  Lumiere brothers; Melies’ Star Films; Pathe; Gaumont; Eclaire; Eclipse; Film d’Art…. 
!  Pathe’s dominance in world markets has been estimated by historians and 
trade journals as ranging from 50-70% (Cawkell & Smith 1972; Puttnam 1997 p. 43; Segrave 1997 p 3; Abel 1999 pp. 48; 
57; Hayward 2000 p. 196) 
 
!  “By 1908, it (Pathe) had become the largest single source of motion pictures in the 
U.S. market” (Segrave 1997 p. 3).  
!  “By 1909, Pathe Freres wordwide sales were double the combined total of all 
producers in the United States combined” (Cawkell & Smith 1972).  
!  “Nordisk is said to have been one of the biggest film firms in the world, second only 
to Pathe” (Neergaard 1950 p. 218). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France  
Lumiere (1893); Gaumont (1895); Pathe (1896) Melies (1897); Éclair (1907); Eclipse (1908). 
 
Denmark  
Nordisk (1906 - floats publicly 1911). 
 
Italy  
Cines (1905 - Rome); Ambrosia (1906 - Turin); Itala (1907 - Turin). 
 
U.S.A. 
Edison (1891), Biograph (1896), Lubin (1896), Selig (1896), Vitagraph (1897), Essanay (1907), Kalem 
(1907), Kleine (1907)  
Leading film companies pre-WW1 
country + studio + (date founded in film industry) 
 
 
 
Some pioneering film companies had 
early access to significant capital 
!  Edison’s film division (1894) was a small part of the inventor’s business empire (G.E.).  
!  Biograph (1896) secured US $200,000 in bank loans against equipment patents. 
!  Georges Melies - independently wealthy and self-financed (1897). 
!  Some were public companies  
!  - Pathe (1897) - raised 1 million francs, Gaumont (1905) - raised 2.5 million francs and  Nordisk (1911).  
!  Cines -line of credit and loans from the Bank of Rome (1906)  
!  Other U.S. Majors – Lubin, Selig, Essanay, Kalem and Vitagraph were all self-financed and grew 
organically 
!  U.S. market - MPPC formed by Edison in 1909 (comprising the 9 largest film companies in the world) 
its size and scale that simply dwarfed its much smaller competitors. 
   
 So why did Pathe dominate? 
 
 
 
  
Five routes to the acquisition of market dominance 
(Hay & Vickers 1987)  
 
1. Government sanction? - No. 
 
2. Growth to dominance through mergers?  No. 
 
3. Growth to dominance through skill, foresight & industry i.e. superior firm performance? YES. 
 
4. Growth to global dominance using collusion? No. (U.S. - MPPC was collusion, Pathe was already #1) 
 
5. Predatory pricing - No.  
Pathe Freres - global dominance 
Hay  & Vickers 5 routes to dominance 
 
 
 
A marketing orientation positively correlates with 
superior market performance by firms within an 
industry.  Day (1994); Deshpande, Farley & Webster (1993); 
Jaworski & Kohli (1992); Narver & Slater (1990). 
 
 
Excellence in six key marketing capabilities 
enables market-driven firms to outperform rivals 
Vorhies, Morgan & Rao (1999); Vorhies & Harker (2000); Vorhies & 
Morgan (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What exactly does dominance acquired through skill, 
foresight & Industry mean?  
 
Source: Cravens (2000) p. 5 
Superior Marketing Capabilities of Market-Driven Firms 
Vorhies, Morgan & Rao (1999); Vorhies & Harker (2000); Vorhies & Morgan (2005) 
Marketing research  
Product development 
Pricing 
Distribution 
Promotion 
Marketing management  
 
 
 
A merger did occur with another film equipment 
manufacturer Bunzli & Continsouza but this merger 
did not play a defining role in Pathes acqusition of 
dominance 
KEY FINDINGS 
From inception Pathe was a marketing 
orientated firm and did possess superior 
marketing capabilities to rival firms like 
Gaumont, Edison, Biograph  
KEY FINDINGS 
Marketing Capabilities - leading studios 1904-1914 
PATHE 
Marketing Research  
Systematic Intel gathered via sales offices, Pathe travelled 
widely and studied markets, Views & Films index, Pathe 
conducted first ever survey of exhibitors needs 
Product Development   
Mass produced films - 1903 - one film per week and one film 
per day from 1906 
Innovation - narrative films, multiple genres -  social dramas, 
epics, feerie films,comedies, hand-coloured films, inter title 
cards 
Distribution 
Global sales network, close channel relations with exhibitors 
 
Promotion 
Sales network, brand and film advertising - first to use film 
posters, trade publicity, film promotion, PR lobby - French 
government.  
 
Pricing 
Penetration pricing in U.S. market  and French fairgrounds, 
premium pricing Omni-Pathe French cinema chain. 
 
Strategic Marketing Management 
Marketing orientation, integrated marketing communications, 
foreign based film studios making local films, strategic brand 
management 
 
 
EDISON, BIOGRAPH, GAUMONT, NORDISK 
Marketing Research  
No evidence of any marketing research activity for Edison, 
Biograph, Gaumont, Nordisk. 
 
Product Development  
Mass production by rival studios. 
Evidence of innovation in film production. 
 
 
 
Distribution 
No significant competitors for Pathe on the world scene. 
 
Promotion 
Brand and film advertising, trade publicity - sold to film 
exchanges.  
 
Pricing 
Edison & Biograph - premium pricing targeting Vaudeville 
houses.  
 
Strategic Marketing Management 
Edison & Biograph were technically focused on U.S. 
market. Gaumont was product focused. Evidence of Nordisk 
showing a marketing orientation tailoring different endings 
for European and American audiences.  
Marketing Intelligence Gathering Capabilities 
!  Pathe had well developed market-sensing capabilities - the sign of a marketing 
orientated firm - it read the U.S.market more successfully than its competitors 
expanding its output of films to supply the nickelodeons whilst Edison and Biograph 
reduced output from 1904-1907 - choosing to target Vaudeville houses for their films 
and equipment - they were either unaware or chose to ignore the nickelodeon boom 
sweeping the U.S.   
Table 2   Production output of the major film companies 1903-1908  
US FIRMS 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 
Biograph 597 326 155 134 123 116 
Edison 334 325 111 54 54 69 
Lubin 592 156 84 126 112 189 
Selig 169 22 5 18 34 65 
EUROPEANS       
Pathe 30 179 81 219 377 460 
George Kleine 
Euro imports 
87 245 132 3 
anom
aly? 
363 564 
Gaumont 17 62 7 16 171 217 
Source: AFI Catalog data 
!    Pathe’s strategic choice of location for its first two U.S. sales offices in N.Y. & Chicago - 
the two largest urban centres experiencing waves of European immigration - the core 
audience for nickelodeons - enabled Pathe to “sense” and monitor the changing dynamic in 
the U.S. market 
!    Pathe rapidly developed a worldwide network of sales offices - its rivals did not. Pathe 
established relationships with local exhibitors in those territories and those offices provided 
market intelligence to head office in Paris. 
!    Film programs changed twice per week so Pathe sales execs could detect changing 
market conditions. 
!    Pathe decision to expand beyond Moscow to St Petersburg and Odessa by 1908 
Russian market = 50% of U.S. market 
!    Pathe was “the first to get in touch with exhibitors and study his requirements” - Motion 
Picture Weekly (Abel 1999 p. 177) 
!    Views and Films Index - trade paper backed by Pathe - the editor had to have his finger 
on the pulse of exhibitors - provided an additional marketing intelligence channel to Pathe 
Marketing Intelligence Gathering Capabilities 
Trade magazine backed by Pathe  
Omitted from the online version of this power point presentation:  
 
Cover Page of Views and Films Index – a French trade paper  
 
No copyright clearance obtained for cover page 
Market Research Capabilities contd. 
!  Describing Charles Pathe’s dominance of the French fairground exhibition market - Puttnam observed: “sharing their 
social background he had an instinctive understanding of his customers” (Puttnam 1998 p. 26).  
!  1907 Pathe went to America and said: “Despite the company’s record-breaking business that fall, the New 
York and Chicago offices remained uneasy because of the persistent unsettled conditions created by the 
proliferating nickelodeons and rental exchanges” (Abel 1999). This confirms Pathe sales offices were 
gathering marketing intelligence and sensing changing market conditions. 
!  1913  The New York Times reported Pathe’s reason for his most recent trip to the America: “to investigate 
the motion picture industry here and to suggest improvement. I have recently travelled much and have 
studied the motion picture industry all over the world and I am satisfied with conditions everywhere 
except in the United States” (New York Times 1913 IV 4:2). 
New product development - Pathe competitive strategy 
was based on quality and innovation 
By 1898, the public was tiring of the “endless diet of scenics and topicals” (Puttnam 1997 pp 31).  
 
In response, Pathe hired Ferdinand Zecca to lead the film studio and made longer narrative films.  
 
1900 Zecca made the six-part History of a Crime that Bousquet (2004) described as “stylishly innovative in its use of 
superimposition” and introduced movie audiences to the serial as a genre.  
 
1901, Pathe innovated and began producing elaborate feerie films for which French cinema became famous and social 
dramas like Les victimes de l’acoholism (1902).  
 
The popularity of feerie films and comedies helped fuel demand for more narrative films.  
 
Pathe mass-produced a wide variety of different genres including dramas, comedies, westerns and epic films like the box 
office hit The Passion Play (1907). Pathe’s popular newsreel was introduced later. 
 
The studio’s breadth of productions was designed to match the programming needs of exhibitors that wanted a regular 
supply of a wide variety of short films (Abel 1999 pp 10).  
 
Pathe was the first studio to hand-colour films using a stencilling process which in later years was automated. Coloured films 
were very popular with audiences particularly in America (Abel 1999 pp 40-47).  
 
Pathe produced many serials including the big hit Perils of Pauline (Abel 1999). 
 
Pathe invented the inter-title cards. 
Pathe trade ad - Passion of Christ - hand coloured + superior quality  
Omitted from the online version of this power point presentation:  
 
2 Advertisements placed by Pathe in U.S. trade papers 
 
No copyright clearance obtained for reproducing these ads 
Distribution capabilities - Key Findings 
 
Pathe strategically planned and controlled its distribution channels, shrewdly exploiting growth 
opportunities more effectively than its competitors.  
 
In France, it targeted the fairgrounds as exhibition customers because in the early years permanent 
cinemas did not exist, so with 75% of fairground operators using Pathe projectors, it effectively 
monopolized that segment (Abel 1994 pp 22-24).  
 
Pathe established the first formal distribution structure in France through the creation of six regional 
distribution companies to service its national cinema chain comprising 200 cinemas (Kindem 2000 p. 196). 
 
Pathe was the first mover of any size and scale into international distribution and in doing so established a 
competitive advantage that lasted for over a decade. At its peak, Pathe operated 31 sales offices throughout the 
United States (Bakker 2003 p. 28) and an international network of 41 sales offices from New York to Bombay 
(Segrave 1997 p. 3).  
 
Pathe’s international network of sales offices provided intensive market coverage on an unrivalled scale and 
eliminated the need for third party agent representation, thereby reducing transaction costs and enabling more 
rapid diffusion of its equipment and films by eliminating third parties. 
 
 
 
Table 3  International distribution arrangements for larger firms - 1894-1914 
PATHE & U.S. firms film distribution in 
Europe 
PATHE & European firms film distribution in U.S. 
market 
1894   Maguire & Baucus London agent for  
           Edison 
1903   Edison sells equipment through its     
          phonograph company in London 
1904   PATHE OPENS IN MOSCOW 
           PATHE OPENS IN BRUSSELS 
1905   PATHE OPENS IN BERLIN 
          PATHE OPENS IN VIENNA 
          PATHE OPENS IN ST PETERSBURG 
1906   Vitagraph opens London office 
          PATHE OPENS IN AMSTERDAM 
          PATHE OPENS IN BARCELONA 
          PATHE OPENS IN MILAN 
          PATHE OPENS IN LONDON 
          PATHE OPENS IN ODESSA 
1909   Agent in Berlin for Lubin  
          PATHE OPENS IN MANILA 
1909   Vitagraph agents in six European capitals 
1909   Markt – London agent for Lubin & Selig 
1909   Essanay London office 
1909   Markt office in Berlin (Lubin & Selig) 
1902   Melies Star Films (France) NY office  
1904   PATHE OPENS IN NEW YORK  
1904   Cines (Italy) NY office 
1904   Miles Brothers US agent for European firms  
1904   Kleine US agent for Urban (Britain) 
1904   Williams, Brown & Earle agent for Hepworth     
           (Brita i n )  
1906   PATHE OPENS IN CHICAGO 
1908   Williamson (Australia) NY office 
1908   Great Northern (Britain) NY office 
1908   Lux (France) American branch 
1908   Raleigh (Britain) 
1950 F i lm Import agent for Raleigh & 
Robert (Britain) 
1910   Agent in Britain/France for IMP films 
1910   IMP office in Berlin 
1910   British agent for Kalem 
1910   Selig has agents in 4 European capitals 
1910   Berlin agent for Essanay 
1910   Gaumont - London agent for Thanhouser 
1910  Markt opens Milan office (Lubin & Selig) 
1910  Agent in London/Paris for Champion 
1910  Market agent in Europe for Kalem 
1910    Éclair (France) NY office 
1910    Sales Company agent for French/Italian firms 
 
 
1911  Selig now selling direct in London 
1911  Kalem has London & Berlin branches 
1911  Essanay Berlin branch 
 
 
 
1912  Selig branches in London, Berlin &         
          St Petersburg and an agent in Budapest 
1912  Essanay branches London & Barcelona 
1912  Lubin branches London & Berlin 
1912  Romanian agent for Vitagraph 
1912    Kleine agent for Cines (Italy) & Eclipse (France) 
1912   Ambrosia (Italy) forms US subsidiary 
1913  Spanish agent for Warrner Brothers 
1913  Selig branches in Paris & Budapest 
1913  Famous Players office in London 
1913  Universal branches Berlin & Copehagen 
1913   Vivaphone agent for Hepworth 
1913    NY agents for smaller Europeans 
 
 
1914  PATHE OPERATED    
          41 FOREIGN BRANCHES 
1914   PATHE OPERATED 31 SALES      
           OFFICES IN THE U.S. MARKET 
Sources: Kristin Thompson pp 194 – 212 and Abel (1994) p. 23 
 
Distribution capabilities - Key Findings contd. 
Pathes quality and range of genres including comedies, dramas, fairy tales, serials and newsreels 
ideally suited the kind of variety needed by nickelodeon owners to program 30-60 minute shows. 
 
At a time when the largest U.S. producers were cutting back - nickelodeons took Pathe programs 
on a standing order contract to guarantee supply.  Provided certainty to Pathes distribution 
operation and funds to self-finance forthcoming productions. 
 
This occurred because Pathe had sole access to the worlds most popular film product.   
 
The Pathe trademark and brand was well-known worldwide and signaled quality product. 
Consequently, Pathe was able to book a much wider release than its competitors. 
 
Trade magazine Moving Picture World reported Pathe sold 75 copies of at least six film titles per 
year at a time when other studios normal print runs were considerably smaller (Abel 1994 p. 24).  
 
Pricing capabilities - Key Findings 
 
 
Pathe employed pricing strategies to match market conditions in different segments and territories. 
 
1904, Pathe used a market penetration pricing strategy to ensure that the rapid take-up by the 
nickelodeons. Pathe sold films 3 cents per foot cheaper than rivals (Abel 1994 p. 23).  
 
1907, the firm switched from outright sales of films to a fixed-fee rental system in which newer, longer films 
rented for higher prices than older, shorter films and Pathe negotiated an agreed fixed percentage of box 
office takings for the newer films (Abel 1994 p 33). This was a switch to a premium pricing strategy that 
optimised Pathe’s financial returns, as well as relieving the financial burden on exhibitors for the need to 
regularly buy new films even if they had a short shelf life. It enabled exhibitors to change their programming 
more frequently at a time when consumer demand was increasing dramatically. 
 
Pathe’s Omnia cinema chain in France employed a premium pricing strategy. 
 
It also helped to extend the shelf-life of Pathe’s films, could be re-rented to other exhibitors. All parties won.  
 
 
Pathe trade ad - pricing strategy for U.S. market @ 12 cents per foot  
Omitted from the online version of this power point presentation:  
 
Advertisement placed by Pathe in U.S. trade papers 
 
No copyright clearance obtained 
Promotional capabilities - Key Findings 
Pathe employed a range of marketing communication strategies to promote its corporate image and films.  
 
Brand advertising in the trade press - the Rooster trademark became synonymous with quality (Abel 1999 
pp 14-15; 44). 
 
Pathe’s international sales network = intensive coverage of all key markets and + closer personalised 
relationships with exhibitors around the world.  
 
Abel (1999) provides historical evidence that Pathe implemented well-orchestrated advertising and publicity 
campaigns to promote its corporate image in the United States and to launch its art-house production affiliate 
SCGAL in France. These campaigns involved use of co-ordinated marketing campaigns in the national press 
on Sundays, advertising in national magazines, the use of posters and promotional booklets for its films 
and the implementation of publicity campaigns (Abel 1999 pp 177-179). 
 
Pathe was the first film company to use posters as a promotional tool to create awareness of its films as 
forthcoming attractions (Abel 1999). The one-sheet poster has since become one of the primary marketing tools 
in the film industry. 
 
Co-owner of Pathe’s new Omnia Cinema, lawyer Edmond Benoit Levy wrote an editorial in a leading cine 
journal Phono-Cine-Gazette, arguing that film should be elevated from its low fairground status to an art 
form (Puttnam 1998 pp 54-55). It took a five-year campaign of political lobbying (public relations) but 
cinema achieved social legitimacy when the French President attended the gala opening of the 1911 film 
season at an opulent Pathe theatre. This indicates a sophisticated use of strategic public relations designed to 
change the perceptions of key stakeholders and influence them to support a particular cause.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branding - quality 
differentiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Omitted from the online version of this powerpoint presentation:  
 
3 Advertisements placed by Pathe in U.S. trade papers 
 
No copyright clearance obtained 
Strategic marketing management 
capabilities - Pathe - Key Findings 
Pathe was a marketing orientated firm that strategically monitored and shaped the business 
environment and strategically managed it’s marketing to create competitive advantage. 
 
Pathe’s initial strategy of pre-emption succeeded until 1908. It began when Pathe embarked upon 
a rapid expansion program to build an industrial empire consisting of the mass manufacturing of 
cameras, projectors, phonographs and films, supported by a network of overseas sales offices 
through which to diffuse its products (equipment and films) worldwide. This gave Pathe first-
mover market advantage when its competitors simply did not have the capacity to challenge.  
 
 
Strategic marketing management capabilities   
- Pathe and film exhibition 
 
 
1905 – French Cinema was a popular amusement under the control of local councils who had the right to 
censor films and did.  
 
Pathe realised that failure to elevate the status of cinema would likely condemn film exhibition at French 
fairgrounds and thereby miss opportunities to diffuse it more widely to the burgeoning middle classes that were 
emerging as France industrialised. Government mandated a week-end for workers. 
 
Pathe saw that the middle classes with rising disposable income + increased leisure time would require 
additional facilities (Puttnam 1997 p 36). 
 
Pathe opened the Omnia-Pathe cinema in Paris as the forerunner of a chain of luxury cinemas – the first in the 
world (Kindem 2000 p. 196), specifically targeting the growing French middle class and their increased 
leisure time (Kindem 2000 p. 196). 
 
By 1911 national circuit would comprise 200 cinemas. 
 
Strategic marketing management capabilities    
- Pathe and film distribution 

“Power would accrue to anyone who could supply a consistently high output of quality product” (Puttnam 1997 pp 36), and this is 
what distinguished Pathe from its rivals in America during the nickelodeon boom (Abel 1999).  
 
Pathe re-orientated the focus of its company from production to distribution - a much more predictable business with far less 
risk than production (Puttnam 1997 p. 36).  
 
Pathe expanded its distribution network overseas and to formalised the non-existent French distribution sector (6 regions). 
 
For Pathe, the financial break-even point on narrative films was the sale of twelve film prints but on average the company was 
actually selling in excess of 30 prints per film (Abel 1999 pp 23). This demonstrated the critical importance of controlling 
distribution  
 
Pathe’s worldwide network of sales offices from 1904-06 across Europe in Moscow, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg, 
Amsterdam, Barcelona, Milan, London and initially in America’s two largest cities – New York and Chicago that provided his 
company with a sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
The company also began to establish Pathe-affiliated film production companies in London, New York, Rome, Moscow and 
Brussels that would each make films tailored specifically for those home markets that would also feed it’s growing worldwide 
distribution network.  
 
Pathe also produced films based on classic French literature to entertain the emerging middle class market segment and to gain 
first mover advantage over rival French firms. It also acquired Film d’Art a smaller competitor specialising in this niche. 
Pathe - quality positioning for 
Film dart 
Omitted from the online version of this powerpoint presentation:  
 
Advertisement placed by Pathe in U.S. trade papers 
 
No copyright clearance obtained 
Strategic marketing management capabilities - U.S. Rivals 
The American Majors were U.S.-centric and product-orientated firms unable to challenge Pathe on the global stage.  
 
In 1906, with the exception of Edison and Biograph, American firms were generally undercapitalised  
 
After meeting Thomas Edison, Adolph Zukor wrote that Edison was personally focused on the technology and demonstrated 
little interest in films or the future of the (Zukor 1953 p. 19-20). 
 
Edison Manufacturing was not market orientated and did not detect or ignored, the explosive growth of the nickelodeons.  
 
The financial resources of the American studios were also being drained by Edison’s lengthy litigation battles against each of 
them for patent infringement. 
 
The U.S. Majors - to form the MPPC (The Trust) and Pathe was the only foreign film company to be invited to join the co-venture 
due to its market power. The MPPC companies badly misread the changing U.S. market in 1911-1913 remaining committed to 
continuing to a low cost strategy producing short films and to not give actors star billing to actors (to contain salaries) at a time when 
public demand for longer feature films was escalating and intensifying interest in the new movie stars appearing in independent films 
was becoming frenzied.   
 
In 1912, Biograph’s President who was also head of the MPPC - Jeremiah J. Kennedy, told Adolph Zukor: “the time is not 
ripe for feature pictures, if it ever will be” (Zukor 1953 pp 73-74)..….2 years later – “Birth of a Nation” the 1st blockbuster 
Strategic marketing management capabilities  
– Gaumont 
In France, Pathe’s closest challenger, Gaumont became a public company in 1905 (eight years after Pathe). 
Leon Gaumont came from a technical background and was primarily technically focused not market 
orientated.  
 
1907  New York manager Berst, expressed concern about the level of piracy of Pathe prints by local 
exhibitors counterfeiting, re-selling and sharing. Pathe responded with a counter-strategy that packaged an 
entire block of films made available to exhibitors on a weekly basis (Abel 1999 pp 89).  
 
This strategy to re-orientate his company towards an increasing focus on distribution and exhibition and 
away from a major reliance on film production deliberately and strategically exploited favourable 
environmental conditions in France, and would offer protection for Pathe, if unfavourable conditions 
eventuated in the increasingly important US export market.  
 
Pathe clearly identified and strategically exploited changing market conditions in America and France as 
early as 1906, before its American and domestic rivals.  
 
 
 
 
Strategic marketing management capabilities - Nordisk 
 
 
 
 “The Danish Nordisk company, a large European film company in the 1910s, focused nearly exclusively on export markets, because of the small Danish market. It relentlessly cut its films to the needs of different 
markets. For the same film it often filmed a happy ending for Western markets, and a sad, dramatic ending for 
Eastern European markets”(Bakker 2003). !
 
Danish company Nordisk was vertically integrated public company that owned cinemas in Northern Europe. It 
was not involved in any merger activity 
. 
 
Nordisk – the world’s second largest exporter until 1914, “established outposts in a cluster of European cities including 
London, Budapest and St Petersburg” as well as in New York (Nowell-Smith 1997 p. 154; Puttnam 1998 pp. 42-43).  
 
Most pre-Hollywood American studios only began establishing export arrangements through European agents from around 
1910. 
 
Nordisk publicly floated later than its rivals in 1911 - too late to compete with Pathe on level terms. 
 
Nordisk - was marketing orientated but became a public company too late and could not operate at Pathes 
level so was relegated to market challenger status. 
 
 
The evidence clearly shows that Pathe possessed superior marketing capabilities to its rivals and that this 
combination of marketing orientation and superior strategic marketing capabilities can account for Pathe’s 
rise to a position of market dominance in the early movie industry from around 1904-1914.  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
Conclusion - Pathe’s dominance results from highly 
effective strategic marketing management 
!  ACQUISITION OF DOMINANCE: 
!  Mergers did not play a defining role in its rise to market leadership. 
!  Pathe did possess six superior marketing capabilities to key rivals 
such as Edison, Biograph, Nordisk and Gaumont. 
!  A marketing orientation and superior marketing capabilities do 
account for the ascension of Pathe’s rise to global market leadership 
and international market dominance between 1904-1914. 
 
